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AIRCRAFT-HOSPITAL SHIPS
States X and Y are at war. Other states. are neutral.
(a) State X proclain1s and 1naintains "\vith vessels of
war the surface blockade of the port of ~Iola on the coast
of Y near the boundary of state B. Blockade proclaination states that the blockade includes aircraft. Aircraft
and subn1arines of Y and of neutral flags pass the blockade line 'vith ease.
( 1) A private seaplane of state B becon1es disabled
and alights inside the blockade lines. A cruiser of X
seizes the sea plane on the ground that it has violated
the blockade.
(2) \\Tould the treahnent of the seaplane be the san1e
if it had alighted 50 n1iles outside the blockading lines
and had been 1net by a yessel of 'var of X 'vhich had
no connection ''ith the blockading forces.
(b) A 1nilitary aircraft of state Y becon1es disabled
off the coast of state B and lands at an airport of B.
State B inunediately interns the aircraft and crew.
(c) At a port of R, ren1ote fron1 X and Y, an arn1ecl
private aircraft of X calls to obtain fuel to take the aircraft directly to its port of departure in state X.
(d) An aircraft of X dropped a tear gas bo1nb upon
a vessel of war of Y. Y declares that this act is contrary
to the laws of war and that it will in retaliation use
bacteriological bo1nbs against X.
(e) A n1ilitary hospital ship of X, the Safety flying
the Reel Cross flag passing 'vithin sight of but not near
a fleet of Y, reports what it has seen to the con11nander
of the fleet of X.
83

84

AIRCRAFT-HOSPITAL SHIPS

(1) Neutral state C learning of this action declines
to allow the Saf ety any rights in its ports other than
those granted to vessels of war.
(2) The fleet of Y fires upon and captures the Safety
and takes it in to a port of Y.
\Vhat action would existing la'v sustain in each of the
ubove cases~
SOLUTION

(a) 1. The private neutral seaplane alighting within
the blockade lines should be seized. The proof of innocence rests upon the seaplane.
2. The private neutral seaplane alighting 50 1niles
outside the blockade lines is not liable to seizure unless
on grounds discovered by visit and search.
(b) The military aircraft and crew should be interned
by state B.
(o) The armed private aircraft of state X should not
be supplied with fuel in a port of R.
(d) The use of tear gas by one belligerent against
another is not prohibited, therefore the resort to the use
of bacteriological bombs in retaliation is unlawful.
(e) 1. Neutral state C, while not under obligation to
pass upon the character of an act of a hospital ship of a
belligerent, may treat such a ship as a vessel of war if
convinced that the ship has forfeited its immunities.
2. 1"'he capture of the Safety by the fleet of Y is lawful, but care should be taken to restrict the use of force
to the minimum.
XOTES

Surface blookade.-\.Vhile it 1nust be adn1itted that
blockade involving absolute prevention of access to the
coast of the ene1ny has rarely, if ever, been possible,
blockade involving danger to the party attempting to
pass has been the rule except in paper blockades.
As was said in 1899 in the case of the Olinde
Rodrigues:
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"To be binding, th~ blockade n1ust be kno,vn, and the blockadieg force must be present; but is there any rule determining
that the presence of a particular force is essential in order to
render a blockade effective? 'Ve do not think so, but, on the
contrary, that the test is whether the blockade is practically
(~ffective, and that that is a question, though a ·mixed one, more
of fact than of law.
"The fourth maxhn of the Declaration of Paris (April 16,
1856), was: 'Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective;
that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent
access to the coast of the enemy.' ::\Ianifestly this broad definition was not intended to be literally applied. The object was
to correct the abuse, in the early part of the century, of paper
blockades, where extensive coasts were put under blockade by
proclamation, without the presence of any force, or an inadequate
force, an·d the question of \Vhat might be sufficient force was
r.ecessarily left to be determined according to the particular
circun1stances." (174 U. S. 510.)

Later in the same case it was said:
"it cannot be that a vessel actually captured in atte1npting to
enter a blockaded port, after warning entered on her log by
a cruiser off that port only a few days before, could dispute the
efficiency of the force to which she \vas subjected.
"As we hold that an effective blockade is a blockade so
effective as to make it dangerous in fact for vessels to attempt
to enter the blockaded port, it follows that the question of effectiveness is not controlled by the number of the blockading
force. In other words, the'-position cannot be maintained that
one modern cruiser though sufficient in fact is not sufficient
as matter of law." (Ibid.)

That the nature o£ blockade was changing was admitted in 1899 and there ha Ye been further changes in
the physical require1nents since that ti1ne. Referring
further to the blockaded port o£ San Juan, P:orto
Rico, where the Olinde Rodrigues 'vas seized it was
said,
"On July 14 and thereafter the port was blockaded by the
armored cruiser New Orleans, \Vhose maximum speed was
twenty-two knots, and her armament six 6-inch breech-loading
rifles, four 4.7-inch breech-loading rifles, ten 6-pounders, four
1.5-inch guns, corresponding to 3-pounders; four 3-pounders in
the tops; four 37-millilnetre automatic guns, corresponding to 1-
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pounllei·s. The range of her guns was five and one half sea
miles or six and a quarter statute mile~. If stationary. she
could command a circle of thirteen Iniles in diameter; if moving,
at maximum speed, ~he could coYer in fiye minutes any point
on a circle of seYenteen 1niles diameter; anll in ten minutes
any point on a cir('le of nineteen miles diameter; her electric
search lights could ~weep the sea by night for ten 1niles di~
tance: her motiYe 11ower tnade her independent of winds and
currents: in these respects and in her arnHlment antl increased
range of guns she so far suqms~ed in effecth·eness the olcltinle war ships that it would be inadmissible to hold that eYen
if a century ago more than one ship was belieYed to be required for an effectiYe blockade, therefore this cruiser was not
sufficient to blockade this port." (Ibid.)

It. would be difficult for a Yessel "·hich has been captured by a blockading force to 1naintain that the blockade 'Yas not effectiYe.
It is further entirely conceiYable that a blockade for
the purpose of preYenting access of bulky· articles
n1ight be n1aintained as effectiYe "·hen s1nall articles
might be taken in to the port by aircraft or subn1arines.
Restrictions on 1.lse of ah·c1·ajt. 1899, 1907.-The use
of aircraft had sufficiently developed at the end of the
nineteenth century to bring it before the First Hague
Peace Conference of 1899 and. at this conference. the
discharge of projectiles fron1 balloons and analogous
1nethods of warfare ''as prohibited for 5 years. \Yhile
this period of prohibition expired during the Russo,} apanese ,,. . ar, both parties respected the prohibition to
the end of the 1var.
Progress in n1atters of aerial lUlYigation was so rapid
that at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907
the states haYing large 1nilitary forces were unwilling
to rene·w the prohibition of 1899. There 'Yere~ howeYer,
1nany conferences upon Yarying aspects of aerial navigation~ and 1nilitary plans recognized that the use of
the air for "Tar purposes should be anticipated.
The experience of the \"Vorld \\7ar gave rise to n1any
questions in regard to the rights of aircraft as affecting
both neutrals and belligerents at sea and on land.
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The 1natter ·was brought before the legal advisers
at the \V ashington Naval Conference, 1921-22, but was
referred to the Com1nission o£ Jurists appointed under
a resolution o£ the conference.
This Co1nmission met at The Hague and concluded
its report on February 19, 1923, particularly treating
0£ the control o£ radio and aircraft in time o£ war. The
rules o£ this report have never been £or1nally adopted,
but are \veighty evidence o£ \Vhat may be considered
reasonable conduct under conditions covered by the
rules.
Air and marine blockade.-That blockade by sur:face
vessels may for certain purposes need the aid o£ airer~:ft to render it effective. under modern conditions is
evident. I£, as is probable, wars o:f the :future are to
use aircra.:ft, then the effectiveness o£ blockade \vill be
measured by consideration o£ the factors entering into
the blockade in which air as well as sur:face vessels art3
involved.
Upon this type o£ blockade Mr. J. M. Spaight in his
discussion o£ the effectiveness o£ a blockade in the a!r,
"assu1ning that neutral contiguous states \vould allo\v
passage through their jurisdiction to the blockaderunning aircraft," says:
"If a blockade is to be recognize(l as extended from the sea
to tlle air aboYe, it n1ust be effective in the air as well as
on the sea, but a clifterent degree of effectiveness will probably
be demanded in the air, because of the greater cliffic:ulty of
controlling passage in that element. Take, for instance, the
blockade of a short extent of ene1ny coast surrounded on each
side by a neutral coast. Access to such a coast by marine
cra: t c:an easily be prevented, the line to be watched being,
ex hypothesi, short; but, for that same reason, access by aircraft
"·ould be extremely difficult to prevent, for, instead of attempting
direct entry or exit, the blockade-running aircraft 'vould always
approach or leave the blockaded area through neutral jurisdiction, into which the belligerent n1ilitary aircraft acting with
the blockading 'varships could not follow them. Even where
a long line of enemy coast is being blockaded, aircraft would
still have an advantage in attempting entry or egress; they
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would not be t ied to the ports, as n1arine craft are, but could
r1ass in or cut anywhere, provided always that their radius
of action was sufficient to enable them to reach a safe landingground.
'"The fact that aircraft could thus find a 'way round' would not
make the blockade ineffective, within the formula of the Declaration of Paris, nor entitle neutral States to claim that it should
not be recognized as a legally existent blockade, the breach of
which involved the condemnation of such aircraft as could in
fact be captured. The fact that shi11s can 11ass (even in fairly
cousiderable numbers, as did the blockade-runners in the Ameriean \Yar of Secession) through the b-lockading cruisers is no
g1 ound for holding the blockade to be ineffectiYe, lH'OYided that
there is on the whole a real danger of capture for any individual
vessel making the attempt. This principle will, no doubt, be
recognized in a still greater degree in regard to aircraft, and
it will be accepted as inevitable that the proportion of captures
to successful evasions which would entitle neutrals to challenge
the effectiveness of the blockade 1nnst be lower in their case
t!Jan in that of ships." ( Spaight, Air Power and \Yar Rights,
2d edition, p. 397.)

(a) Bloclcade; mrface, subnwrine, and aircraft.The Declaration of Paris, 1856, proYides that "Blockades in order to be binding n1ust be effective." This
provision w·as dra 'vn for the purpose of putting an end
to so-called ''paper blockades." This declaration 1nade
in 1856 referred to blockades in which surface ships
'vere the custo1nary 1neans of rendering the closing of
the ports effective. The san1e principle w·ould be generally applicable "·hether the proclan1ation was in regard to a blockade on, over, or under the sea; to be
binding the blockade should be effective.
In 1899, ~Ir. Chief Jhstice Fuller, in the case of the
Olinde Rodrigues, said, "To be binding, the blockade
must be known, and the blockading force 1nust be present; but is there any rule of law determining that the
presence of a particular force is essential in order to
render the blockade effective? -,~Ve do not think so, but
on the contrary, that the test is whether the blockade
is practically effective, and that that is a question,
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though a Inixed one, 1nore of fact than of la,v." (174
U. S. 510.) In general it has been considered that an
effective blockade is one that renders access or egress
froin the blockaded port dangerous, and that, in a case
" . . here the craft that has atten1pted to pass the blockade and has been captured cannot establish that, it is
not effective. The captured craft Inay, ho"~ever, plead
on other grounds that it has not violated the blockade.
The burden of such proof rests upon the captured
craft.
A blockade n1aintained by surface vessels only without means of preventing or rendering dangerous the
passage of aircraft or su'bn1arine would be a "paper
blockade" insofar as such craft 'vere concerned even
though proclailned to include these.
Any seaplane 1net at sea by a vessel of war may be
Yisited and searched to detern1ine its relation to the
hostilities and it n1ay be treated according to the evidence found. In recent years on account of in1proved
1neans of con1n1unication it 'vould be difficult to prove
Jgnorance.
Aircraft in distress.-The rules for entry of surface
vessels in distress 'vould not apply to aircraft. In the
period before the \V or ld \V ar it was thought by son1e
that aircraft 1night enter and sojourn in neutral jurisdiction under the Saine conditions as those prescribed
for surface vessels. The practice of states 'vhile neutral
in the \Vorld \\Tar from the Netherlands to China was
to use the force at their disposal to intern belligerent
aircraft entering their jurisdiction. Dutch gunners shot
do,vn aircraft flying oYer Dutch territory. Other states
did the saine. Disabled aircraft entering neutral jurisdiction 'vere usually detained and interned until the end
of the war. Force 1najeu.re or distress were regarded as
too indefinite to differentiate fro1n intentional entrance
in case of aircraft and the accounts of aviators of the
\Vorld \Var seen1 to justify the neutral practice of prohi81178-36-7
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bition of entrance and internn1ent in case of violation
of the prohibition. Articles 39, 40, and 42 of the Hague
Rules of 1923 show the attitude of the Conunission of
Jurists.
".Article 2·9. Belligerent aircraft are bound to respect the
rights of neutral powers ancl to abstain within the jurisdiction
of a neutral State from the commission of any act "~hich it is
the duty of that State to preYent.
"Article 40. Belligerent military aircraft are forbidden to
enter the jurisdiction of a neutral State." * * *
".Article 42. A neutral Government n1ust use the means at its
disposal to preYent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent
Jnilitary aircraft and to compel thetn to alight if they haye
entered such jurisdiction.
"A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal
to intern any belligerent 1nilitary aircraft which is within its
jurisdiction after haYing alighted fo·r any reason whatsoyer,
together with its crew and the passengers, if any." (1924 NaYal
'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 131.)

Internment of British seaplanes.-ln a Inen1oranclum
of the British Foreign Office of nlay 31, 1916, the K etherlands Govern1nent ''as requested to per1nit a seaplane
which had been rescued and taken in by a Dutch lugger
to be dispatched to Great Britain. Certain principles
were set forth in this men1orandum:
"A Seaplane belonging to His l\Iajesty's forces ·\YaS recently
ohliged on account of engine trouble to descend while over the
North Sea. The pilot "~as rescued by a Dutch fishing boat,
"·hich took both him and the seaplane into a Dutch port. The
Netherlands Government, though they have released the pilot,
appear to consider it their duty to retain the seaplane for the
duration of the war. After a careful consideration of the ques·
tion, His ::\lajesty's Goyernment feel bound to dissent from this
Yiew, and belieye that the Xetherlands Government are under
no obligation to intern the ·machine.
"The Netherlands Government, in releasing the pilot, appear
to haye considered that he was in the same position as a member
of the crew of a ship-wrecked belligerent "~arship who is picked
up by a neutral merchant vessel and conyeyed to a neutral
port; such a person, under the rules of The Hague ConYention
No. 10, of 1907, is entitled to be released. His ::\Iajesty's Gov-
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crn1nent belieYe their decision on this point to be correct and
consider that, while none of the rules expressly laid down by
international law exactly fit the case of the seaplane, a further
exan1ination of the principles which lie behind the rules which
compel neutrals to intern belligerent forces in certain circumstances shows that the seaplane should also be released.
"The rules concerning internment are not based on any one
~ingle and uniform principle.
This fact explains itself when
0ne takes into consideration 1hat these rules have grown up
gradually and seYerally and were, before the Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, customarily agreed upon from different motives. The consequence is that the rules governing
internment differ not only with regard to the intern1nent of
soldiers on neutral land and internment of warships in neutral
llarbours, but also with regard to the internment of troops in
general, and the internment of such soldiers as have escaped
from captivity.
"One of the basic reasons for the rules concerning internment is no doubt the fact that a belligerent is entitled to insist
that such enemy forces as have crossed neutral territory for
the purpose of escaping capture, shall not be enabled to leave
the neutral territory and again resort to hos1ilities. But this
concerns only enenfy forces which have deliberately entered
neutral territory for the purpose of escaping capture: it cannot apply to such enemy forces as for other purposes cross into
ueutral territory, or even cross accidentally without knowledge
of the neu1ral frontier. No,v, all these must likewise be interned, and the basic reason for their internment is that, in
case these troops are not interned, the other belligerent would
be justified in crossing into the neutral territory on his part
and attacking the enemy there.
"As regards the internment of men-of-war, the basic reasons
are also manifold. One is-just as in the case of fugitive
troops-that a belligerent is entitled to insist that enemy menof-war which deliberately enter neutral harbours for the purpose of escaping capture, shall not after some length of time
be allowed 1o leave and resort to hostilities again, although
they may leave if they only stay twenty-four hours. Other reasons are that a neutral must not allow belligerent men-of-war
to make his harbours the base of military operations, the base
of supply beyond a certain limit, the base for repairing vital
damages, and the like." (Parliamentary Papers, 1\iiscellaneous,
No. 4 [1918] Cd. 8985, p. 3; see also 1931 Naval War College,
International Law Situations, pp. 14-22.)
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rrhe Netherlands explained that under strict rules
of neutrality, the Queen's GoYerninent, to their regret,
\Yere unable to con1ply \Yith the request of the British
GoYerninent until the end of the \Yar.
Later in the case of the British seaplane 1.Vo. 1B32,
\Yhich caine do\Yn in the North Sea, Septen1ber 23,
1917, sixty 1niles off the Dutch coast and w·as rescued
and to\Yed by a Dutch fishing Yessel to the Helder, the
British clain1ed that the seaplane should be released a8
\Yell as the personnel. The Dutch GoYennnent released the personnel, but declined to release the aircraft
till the end of the \Yar.
1.Vaval 1Var 0 ollege discussion., 1926.-In referring to
intern1nent during the \'Toriel \'Tar, it \vas said in the
solution of situation III, 1926, that:
'·During the Vt" oriel 'Var for the first time the question of aircraft in relation to neutral jurisdiction beeame one of great
practical importan~e. 'Yhile practice was not, at first, in every
instance uniform, gradually it came to be o1:ecognized that belligerent aircraft .bad no right to enter neutral jurisdiction. Some
of the neutral states for a time questioned the necessity of denying entry to aircraft, and considered permitting entry on tenns
analogous to those a11plied to maritime vessels of war. Switzerland nnd the Netherlands, from their geographical position as .
ueutral islands surrounded by belligerents, had to face the JH'oblem in n1ore varied tnanifestations. Both states 1naintained the
right to use necessary force to prevent entrance of belligerent
aircraft or even to intern aircraft entering under force maje11re.
Djsabled belligerent air~raft, aircraft trying to escape frmn the
enemy, aircraft lost in fog or stonn, "·ere· with their personnel
forced to land and interned by neutral states. Early in the "~ar
there was some uncertainty in regard to hydro11Ianes in Xorway,
and later Denmark permitted some German deserters to remain
flfter entering Dani~.h jurisdiction in ri stolen aircraft. The
Netherlands interned A1nerican aircraft alighting within Dutch
jurisdiction after a battle over the high sea with Germany. The
Swiss authorities similarly interned American fliers when returning from an observation flight and forced by motor trouble to
land within Swiss jurisdiction. There were many cases in which
tlle crews were interned "·ben the aircraft 'vere destroyed either
intentionally or by accident. "r,hen aircraft personnel "·as
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rescued on the high seas and brought "·ithin neutral jurisdiction, the practice was usually to release then1." (1926 ~aval
'Yar College, International Law Situations. p. 100.)

(b) Aircraft.-The treatment of military aircraft
alighting ·within neutral jurisdiction "for any reason
"~hatsoeYer" 'vas discussed at The Hague in the ComInission of Jurists in 1923 and in n1eetings of other
bodies since that ti1ne. The eon census of opinion has
been that the duty of internment of n1ilitary aircraft
is eYen more i1nperative than that to intern troops
entering neutral jurisdiction.
Article 53, Hague Rules, 1923.-·The report of the
Conunission of Jurists~ February 19~ 1923, contained as
article 53 regulations under which neutral private aircraft were liable to capture. 'Vhile these rules have
not been internationall}' adopted, they embody n1any
accepted principles of international law.
.A.rticle 53 provides that:
"A neutral priYate aircraft is liable to capture if it * * *.
" (a) Resists the legitimate exercise of belligerent rights.
"(b) Violates a prohibition of which it has had notice issued
by a belligerent com1nanding officer under article 30.
" (c) Is engaged in unneu tral service.
" (d) Is armed in time of war when outside the jurisdiction
of its own country.
" (e) Has no external marks or uses false marks.
" (f) Has no papers or insufficient or irregular papers.
"(g) Is n1anifestly out of the line between the point of departure and the point of destination indica ted in its papers
and a.fter such enquiries as the belligerent may deem necessary,
no good cause is shown for the de-viation. The aircraft, together with its crew and passengers, if any, may be detained
l•y the belligerent, pending such enquiries.
"(h) Carries, or itself constitutes, contraband of war.
" ( i) Is engaged in breach of a blockade duly established
aw1 effectiYe1y Inaintained.
"(k) lias been transferred from belligerent to neutral nationality at a elate ancl in circu1nstances indicating an intention
of eYading the (•onsequences to which an enemy aircraft, as
such, is exposed.
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"Provided that in each case (excevt (k)) the ground for
capture shall be an act carried out in the flight in which the
neutral aircraft came into belligerent hands, i. e., since it
left its point of departure and before it reached its point of
destination." (10:2-! Xaval 'Yar College, International Law Documents, p. 146.)

Paragraph (i) of these rules 'Yas quite fully discussed by the Co1n1nission, and their report sho,Ys the
trend of the discussion.
"(i) The ninth ground for capture is that the aircraft is engaged in a breach of blockade. 'Blockade' is here used in the
same sense in which it is e1nployed in Chapter 1 of the Declaration of London, that is to say, an operation of war for the
purpose of preventing by the use of warships ingress or egress
of conunerce to or frmn a defined portion of the enemy's
coast. It has no reference to a blockade enforced without the
use of warships, nor does it cover 1nilitary investnwnts of I1articular localities on land. These operations, \Yhich nwy be
termed 'aerial blockade,' were the subject of special examination by the experts attached to the various Delegations, who
fra1ned a special report on the subject for consideration by the
Full Commission. The conditions conte1npla ted in this subhead are those of warships enforcing a blockade at sea with
aircraft acting in co-operation with them. As the primary elenlents of the blockade will, therefore, be 1naritime, the recognized principles applicable to such blockade, as for instance,
that it 1nust be effective (Declaration of Paris, article 4),
and that it 1nust be duly notified and its 11recise limits fixed,
will also apply. This is intended to be shown by the use of
the words 'breach of blockade duly established and effectively
maintained' in the text of the sub-head.
"It is too early yet to indicate with precision the extent to
which the co-operation of aircraft in the maintenance of blockade at sea may be possible; experience alone can show. Nevertheless, it is necessary to indicate the sense in which the Commission has used the word 'effective.' As pointed out in the
Declaration of London, the effectiveness of a blockade is a
question of fact. The word 'effective' is intended to ensure that
it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent
access to the enem~· coast-line. The prize court may, for instance.
have to consider what proportion of surface vessels can escape
the watchfulness of the blocka'ding squadrons without endangering the effectiveness of the blockade; this is a question which the
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prize court alone can determine. In the san1e way, this question
may have to be considered where aircraft are co-operai:!ng in
the 1naintenance of a blockade.
"The invention of the aircraft cannot impose upon a belligeren~
'vho desires to institute a blockade the obligation to employ
aircraft in cooperation 'vith his naval forces. If he do~~ not
do so, the effectiveness. of the blockade would not be affected
by failure to stop aircraft passing through. It is only where the
belligerent endeavors to render his blockade effective in the
air-space above the sea as well as on the surface itself that
captures of aircraft will be made and that any question of the
effectiveness of the blockade in the air could arise.
"The facility with "·hich an aircraft, desirous of entering the
blockaded area, could evade the blockade by passing outside the
geographical limits of the blockade has not escaped the attention of the C01nmission. This practical question may affect
the extent to which belligerents will resort to blockade in future,
but it does not affect the fact that where a blockade has been
establishe'd and an aircraft attempts to pass through into the
blockaded area within the lilnits of the blockade, it should be
liable to capture.
"The Netherlands Delegation proposed to suppress (i) on the
grounds that air blockade could not be effectively 1naintained,
basing its opinion on its interpretation of the experts' report
on the subject.
"The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegations voted
for its maintenance. The American Delegation voted for its
maintenance ad referendum~." (Ibid., p. 144.)

Armed private aireraft.-The Hague Comn1ission o:f
1923 also gave consideration to the arming o:f private
aircra:ft and expressed the opinion that the interests o:f
all would be better served i:f the arming o:f private airera:ft should be prohibited. Since 1923 this opinion has
been repeatedly confirmed because giving rise to many
possible n1isunderstandings and there has been introduced the general understanding that public aircraft
only may be ar1ned.
(c) Military aircraft in neut1~az jurisdiction.-While ·
there is still doubt in regard to the obligations of a
neutral state in respect to private aircraft o:f a belligerent nationality, the rules of the Hague Co1nmis-
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sion of Jurists of 1923 are generally considered as binding as to public and 1nilitary aircraft. These rules of
the Hague Conunission 'Yere based on a draft subInittecl by the . A.1nerican delegation.
The report of the Conunission in conunenting on this
article says,
"The l1l'OYision in the article is limited to military aircraft because it is only in respect of such craft that the prohibition on
entry is absolute. Under article 12 the admission of priYate or
11ublic non-military aircraft is within the discretion of the neutral State. 'Yhere such aircraft penetrate \Yithin neutral jurisdiction in Yiola tion of t.be n1easures prescribed by the neutral
Po"·er, they \Yill be subject to such 11enalties as the neutral
Power may enact; these Inay or may not include internment.
Recognition of this fact has enabled the Commission to omit a
provision which figured as article 11 in the American draft:
'A neutral GoYernment 1nay intern any aircraft of belligerent
nationality not conforming to its regulations.'
''The obligation on the part of the neutral Power to intern
(·oYers not only the aircraft, but its equipment and contents.
The obligation is not affected by the circun1stance which led to
the Inilitary aircraft coming within the jurisdiction. It applies
whet.her the belligerent aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction,
Yoluntarily or involuntarily, and whateYer the cause. It is an
obligation owed to the 011posing belligerent and is based upon the
fact that the aircraft bas come into an area where it is not
subject to attack by its opponent.
"The only exceptions to the obligation to intern an aircraft
are those alising under articles 17 and 41. The first relates
to flying ambulances. Under the second, an aircraft on board
}l warship is deemed to be part of her, and therefore will follow the fate of that warship if she . enters neutral ports or
'-Yater:-:. If she enters under circumstances which render her
immune from internment, such aircraft will likewise escape
internn1en t.
"The obligation to intern belligerent n1ilitary aircraft entering- neutral jurisdiction entails also the obligation to intern
the personnel. These will in general be combatant members of
the belligerent fighting forces, but experience has already shown
that in time of war n1ilitary aeroplanes are employed for transporting passengers. As it may safely be assumed that in time
of war a passenger would not be carried on a belligerent military aircraft unless his journey was a 1naHer of importanc~ to
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the Government, it seems reasonable also to comprise such
passengers in the category of persons to be interned." ( Ibid,
p. 133.)

Retaliation.-Particularly during and since the 'Vorld
''Tar the idea of retaliation has recei Yed rene"yed a ttention. Retaliation \Yas before 1914 regarded as in the
reahn of acts not in accord \Yith internationalla'' 'vhich
n1ight be resorted to against an opponent "yho in \var
disregarded the la\v of \var. Retaliatory 1neasures ·were
to be strictly limited to re1nedying the breach of the
law by the enemy and to be directed toward the enemy
though a neutral 1night be inconvenienced or even incidentally injured, but the act of retaliation should not be
ai1ned at the neutral or directly restrict the rights of a
neutral. It \vas adn1itted that the la'v of contraband,
blockade, and unneutral serYice did limit the peacetime
rights of a neutral state, but these restrictions were gent:rally accepted.
Retaliation has usually been threatened or resorted
to \Yhen ne\Y 1nethods or 1neans of ''ar ha Ye con1e into
use. '"l'hreats \Yere made in the Franco-Prussian ,,. . ar,
1870, that balloons \Youlcl be treated. as spies, and in the
Russo-Japanese ,,. . ar, 190-!--5, that new·spaper correspondents using radio \Yould be treated as spies. During the ' '?"orld ,,. . ar there \Yere n1any propositions to
the effect that a Yiators, if ca pturecl, should be hanged or
in11nediately shot, or in any case, should be treated as
cri1ninals. Sin1ilar propositions \Yere adYanced in regard to the personnel of snb1narines regardless of their
conduct.
In the ti1ne of 'Yar there is al '"ays a ready response
to ru1nors of unlawful conduct on the part of an opponent. Propaganda and \Yar hysteria, serYe to 1nake
de1nands for retaliation or for reprisals popular and
to n1ake pictures of ene1ny disregard of la'' readily
accepted.
''Thile there haYe been atte1npts to regulate in son1e
degree reprisals on land by international conYentions,
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such conYentions hnYe not been fonnnlly extended to
1naritin1e and aerial \Yarfnre. It \Youlcl, ho,yever, be
safe to nssu1ne that in principle the snn1e ln'Y \vould
apply over, on, and in the sen.
The late Prof. A. Pearce Higgins, \Yho aided in preparing son1e of the nrgtunents for the British GovernInent in prize cases, after the cases of the Zan1ora,
Leona1?a, and Stigstad, proposed the follo\ving bases for
considern tion:
"1. Retaliation is a right of the belligerent "\Yhich must be exer<'ised only after the greatest proYoca tion, and as a last resort.
"2. Retaliatory 1neasures must primarily be directed only
against the enemy and need not be of an identical character
with the wrong c01nplained of.
"3. In the exercise of retaliation the fundamental laws of
bun1anity n1ust be obserYed.
"4. In all cases of retaliation which inYolYe inconvenience or
detrilnent to neutrals, Prize Courts of the belligerents should
l1a\e jurisdiction both to enquire into the facts alleged as giving
rise to the retaliatory measures, and also to decide "\Yhether the
means adopted inflict on neutrals a degree of inconvenience in
excess of that necessary to terminate the alleged illegalities.
"5. Neutrals should be allowed compensation in all cases
"\Vhere there is undue delay in dealing with their cases in the
belligerent Prize Courts under retaliatory orders, or where ship
or cargo is released in consequence of an erroneous application
of the order.
"6. Retaliatory orders, since they are in derogation of the
general rules of law, 1nust, in case of ambiguity of language, be
construed against the states issuing then1." (Pearce Higgins,
International Law and Relations, p. 237.)

Protocol on gases~ 1925.-At the \Vashington Conference on the Li1nitntion of Ar1na1nent. 1921-22, the
proposal to li1nit the use of gas \vas coupled \vith regulations in the use of sub1narines. The Advisory Board
of the A1nerican delegation sub1nitted a report from its
subcommittee on new agencies of \varfare which contained the following:
"Resolved, That chemical warfare, including the use of gases,
whether toxic or nontoxic, should be prohibited by internationa1
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agreement, and should be classed with such unfair n1ethods of
warfi1re as poisoning 'Yells, introducing germs of disease, and
other methods tb.a t are abhorrent in modern "·arfare." (Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 'Vashington, November
12, 1921-February 6, 192.2, p. 732.)

The French version of this resolution ""aS as follo,vs :
"II est decide: Que la guerre chimique, cmnprenan t l'usage
des gaz, to:s:iques ou non toxiques, devraft etre interdite par un
rtccord international, et classee parmi les methodes de guerre
deloyales, telles que l'empoisonnement des puits, la propagation
de germes de maladies et autres n1ethodes execrables de la guerre
modern e." (Ibid, p. '733.)

It will be observed that the :form in both languages
is "toxic or nontoxic." The chairman of the conference,
Ivfr. Secretary Hughes, also called attention to a report
of the General Board of the United States Navy in
'vhich, referring to the question "Should gas warfare be
prohibited," it was stated :
"4. The two principles in warfare, (1) that unnecessary suffering in the destruction of combatants should be avoided, (2)
that innocent noncombatants should not be destroyed, have been
accepted by the civilized world for more than one hundred years.
The use of gases in warfare in so far as they violate these. two
principles is almost universally condemned to-day, despite its
practice for a certain period during the world war.
''5. Certain gases, for example, tear gas, could be used without
violating the two principles above cited. Other gases will, no
doubt, be invented which could be so employed; but there will
be great difficulty in a clear and definite demarcation between
the lethal gases and those which produce unnecessary suffering
as distinguished from those gases which simply disable temporarily. Among the gases existing to-day there is undoubtedly a
difference of opinion as to the class to which certain gases
belong. 1\Ioreover, the diffusion of all these gases is practically
beyond control and many innocent non-combatants would share
in the suffering of the war, even if the result did not produce
death or a permanent disability.
"6. The General Board foresees great difficulty in clearly limiting gases so as to avoid unnecessary suffering in gas warfare
and in enforcing rules .which will avert suffering or the possible
destruction of innocent lives of noncombatants, including women
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and children. Gas warfare threatens to bec01ne so efficient as to
endanger the Yery existence of ciYilization.
"7. The General Board belieYes it to be sound 11olicy to prohibit
gas ·warfare in e\ery form and against eYers objectiYe, and so
recommends." (Ibid, p. 734.)

Reference in the discussion ·was n1ade to article 171
of the Treaty of \T ersailles, J nne 28, 1919, \vhich as applying to gas in the English and French is:
"The use of asphyxiating, 11oisonous or other gases and all
the analogous liquids, 1naterials or deYices being prohibited,
their 1nanufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in
Germany."
"The sa1ne applies to materials specially intended for the
manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices."
(Ibid, p. 738.)
"L'en1ploi des gaz asphyxiants, to:;\:iques ou similaires, ainsi
que de tous liquides, matieres ou procedes analogues, etant
prohibe la fabrication et !'importation en sont rigoureusement
interclites en Allen1agne.
''II en est de me1ne du materiel speciale1nent destine a la
fabrication, a la conser,ation on a l'usage desdits produits ou
procecU~s."
(Ibid, p. 739.)

A convention e1nbodying this principle w·as dra\Yll

''r

up at the
ashingion Conference, but did not beco1ne
effectiYe been use not ratified by all the po,yers.
In 1925, ho\YeYer, a protocol relating to gns onl~T \Yas
opened for signature at GeneYa, and a large nu1nber of
ratifications or adhesions haYe been deposited. The
parts of this protocol referring particularly to the
conduct of war are in English and French as follows:
"'\Yhereas the use in war of a~ph~·xiating. 110isonons or other
gases, and of all analog-ous liquicls material~ or deY ices. has
been justly conden1netl by the general 011inion of the ciYilized
world; and
"'\Yhereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in
Treaties to whkh the majorit;\· of Powers of the world are
Parties; and
'''l.',o the e1Hl that this l1l'Ohibition ~hall be uniYersally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; ·
DECL..-\P.E:

"That the I-Iigh Contracting Parties. so far as they are not
already Parties to Treaties 11rohibiting such use, accept this
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prohibition, agree to extend this vrohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of wnrfai·e and agree to be hound as between them~elYes according to the terms of this declaration."
(9-! League of Xations Treaty Series, p. 65.)
''Considerant que l'eD111loi a la guerre de gaz asphyxiants,
toxiques ou silnilaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matieres ou
procedes nnalogues, a ete a juste titre condarnne par l'opinion
generale du 1noncle civilise;
"Considerant que !'interdiction de cet en111loi a ete formulee
dans des traites auxquels sont Parties la plupart des Puissances cln monde;
"Dans le dessein de faire uniYersellement reconnaitre commeincoq1oree au droit international cette interdiction, qui s'impose·
eg:alement a la conscience et a la }1l'atique des nations,
''DECLAREXT:

''Que les Hautes Parties contractantes, en tant qu'elles ne
sont pas deja parties a des traites prohibant cet emploi,
reconnaissent cette interdiction, acceptent d'etendre cette interdiction d'emploi aux n1oyens de guerre bacteriologiques: et
conyiennent de se considerer connne liees entre elles aux termes
de cette declaration." (Ibid, p. 65.)

It would seem that the prohibition in English in the
words "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases" is not
identical with the French "gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou
similaires." The English would seem to be a general
prohibition o:f the use o:f gas while the French would
prohibit gases o:f specific types. Both would prohibit
bacteriological warfare.
It could scarcely be asserted even in 1925 that the use
o:f all kinds o:f gases "had been condemned by the general opinion o:f the civilized 'vorld." Indeed smoke
screens and si1nilar n1ethods were then and are no\v
approved. It 1nay be difficult to make a legal distinct ion between sn1oke in the eyes o:f an enemy and a
gas that may ·cause tears, while neither may cause suffering which the protocol aims to prohibit and which
"has been justly conde1nned by the general opinion of
the civilized 'Yorld."
Treaty of Versailles, arrticle· 171.-The treaty o£ Ver~ailles though signed by a large number o:f states was
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not ratified by all the signatories, and son1e of its proYisions have for various reasons beco1ne inoperative .
. t\..rticle 171 in the French and English versions of
the 'l"'reaty of \T ersailles is as follo,vs:
"A.RTICLEJ

171."

"L'emploi des gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires, ainsi
que de tous liquides, matieres ou procedes analogues, etant
prollibe, la fabrication et !'importation en sont rigoureuse1nent
interdites en Allemagne.
"II en est de meme du n1ateriel specialement destine a la fabrication, a la conservation ou a rusage desclits produits ou procedes.
"Sont egalen1ent prohibees la fabrication. et !'importation en
Allemagne des chars blindes, tanks ou de tout autre engin simiIaire pouvant servir a d_es buts de guerre."
"ARTICLE

171."

"The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all
analogous liquids, 1naterials or devices being prohibited, their
n1anufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.
"The same applies to materials specially intended for the
manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices.
"The n1anufacture and the in1portation into Germany of
armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for
use in war are also prohibited."

\Vhile the accuracy of the translation of the article
n1ay be open to question, the English forn1 does not seen1
to conforn1 to international law because there are son1e
gases other than asphyxiating and poisonous, the use of
which is not prohibited in war. If a gas causes unnecessary suffering, its use would be considered contrary to
jnternationalla,v. The use of a tear gas bo1nb n1ight be
preferred to a projectile that "\Vould result in asphyxiatjng the personnel of the vessel of 'var by dro,vning, and
tear gas has not yet been included in the list of prohibited gases.
B ornbardment from aircraft.-Regulations in regard
to the discharge of projectiles fron1 aircraft have been
n1ade. None are now generally accepted unless it be
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admitted that an a1nendn1ent in La,vs and Customs of
VV ar on Land of 1907 by which it 'vas thought by so1ne
the. prohibition of undefended towns was extended to
operations of aircraft. The 1899 convention had prohibited bombardment of undefended "towns, villages,
habitations, or buildings." The 1907 inserted the 'vords
"by any n1eans whatever." This would not in any case
apply to dropping bo1nbs on a vessel of war.
The proposed Hague rules of 1923 in regard to aerial
·w arfare in article 24 provide :
"1. Aerial bombardment is legitilnate only when directed at a
military objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.
"2. Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the following objectives: military forces; military
works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting
important and "·ell-known centres engaged in the manufacture
of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies; lines of
communication or transportation used for military purposes.
"3. The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings not in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations
of land forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives
specified in paragraph 2 are so situated that they cannot be
b01nbarded without the indiscri,minate bOinbardment of the
cjvilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment.
"4. In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land
forces, the bombardment of cities, to\vns, villages, dwellings or
buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable
presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger
thus caused to the civilian population.
"5. A belligerent State is liable to pay compensation for
injuries to person or to property caused by the violation by any
of its officers or forces of the provisions of this article." (1924
Naval War College, International Law Documents, p. 120.)

Attention on this article 'vas particularly fixed upon
land warfare and the report of the Co1nn1ission of
Jurists explains the article as follo"rs:
"Agreement on the following article specifying the objects
which may legitimately be bombarded from the air was not
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reached without prolonged discussion. Xumerons 11ropo~.ah:; were
put forward by the various delegations before unanimity was
l1ltinlately attaine<l. The text of these IH'Ol10Snls will be found
in the Ininntes. In particular, Inention mny be made ot" an
Italian pro1w~al of the Sth Fl'bruan·, on whieh the text ultinately ad011ted was in great part founded. Regret was expressed
by some delegations that a more far-reaching lH'ohibition did not
meet with unanimous acceptance.
"'l'he terms of the article are so clear that no explanation
of the provi~ions is necessary, but it 1nay be 'vell to state that
in the phrase in paragraph 2 'military establishments or depots' the word 'depots' is intended to cover all collections of
supplies for n1ilitary use which haYe passed into the possession
of the 1nilitary authorities and are ready for delivery to the
forces, 'distinctively militar;\· supplies' in the succeeding phrase is
intended to cover those which by their nature show that they
are certainly man ufacturecl for 1nili tary purposes.
"If the code of rules of aerial warfare should eventually be
annexed to a conYention, paragraph 5 of the article would find a
n1ore appropriate place in the conyention.
"It will be noticed that for aerial b01nbardn1ent the test
adopted in article 25 of the Land 'Varfare Regulations, that of
the town, &., being defended, is abandoned. The nature of the
objective or the use to 'vhich it is being put now bec01nes the
test." (Ibid.)

There would be no question that a Yessel of ·war "\vould
be and has been regarded as a n1ilitary objective.
Proposals before the conference for the 1·eduction and
lhnitation of a·r1nantents, 1932.-Numerous proposals
"\Yere presented to the conference com1nonly referred to
as the "Disarinainent Conference."
On February 5, 1932, the French delegation in the
prea1nble to certain proposals stated :
"The Government of the Republic. conscious of the gravity
of the problen1 to be soh·ed, is convinced that, in accordance
with previous work of the League of Nations, the Conference
should deal with this problen1 as a part of general policy.
"This is all the 1nore important since it n1eets at a time of
economic and moral tension, at a time of general disturbance
and uneasines~, when events e1nphasize the absolute necessity
of a better organisation in a tormented world.
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"The Governn1ent of the Republic is anxious to honor the
pron1ise contained in its memorandum of July 15th, 1931, ann
to reply to the repeated appeals made by the League of Nations, notably in the resolution of the Assembly of 1927. It
intends thus to fulfil a double duty.
"It assumes that, on the basis of the draft Convention of
19-30, action will be taken with the least possible delay.
"Further, it presents herewith proposals for placing civil
aviation and bombing aircraft, and also certain material of
land and na\al forces, at the disposal of the League of Nations;
for the creation of a preventive and puniti\e international
force; for the political conditions upon which such measure:;
depend ; and, lastly, for new rules providing for the protection
of civil population." (League of Nations PubliGations, ConE.
D. 56, 1931. IX. p. 1.)

The French Government proposed that civil aviation
and bo1nbing aircraft be placed at the disposal o£ the
League o:f Nations. In the detailed provisions o£ the
French propo~als, it 'yas stated:
"In addition to the preceding 11r0Yisions, the GoYernment of
the Republic 11roposed the arlo11tion of the following rules which
can be adopted unconditionally:
" (a) The use by aeroplanes and by land or na Yal artillery of
projectiles which are specifically incendiary or which contain
poison gases or bacteria is forbidden, whate\er the objectiYe."
(Ibid., p. 3.)

The Ger1nan delegation also submitted certain positive proposals on February 18, 1932:
"17. The maintenance of air forces of any kind is forbidden.
The total air force n1a terial which has so ·far been either in
serYice or in reserve or on stock shall be destroyed, except
those armaments which are to be incorporated in the quantities allowed for land and na,Tal forces.
"18. The dropving of bOinbs or any other objects or 1naterials
serving n1ilitary purposes from aircraft, as well as all preparations to this effect shall be forbidden without any exception.
"19. \Vith a view to strictly enforcing the prohibition of any
military aviation, the following shall, inter alict, be forbidden.
" (a) Any instruction and training of any person in a Yia tion
having a n1ilitary character or a military purpose." (Ibid.,
Con f. D. 79. IX. 1932, p. 3.)
81178'-'--36--8
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rrhe Soviet delegation Blade the nlOSt COlnprehensive
proposal to the effect that the real organization for peace
and security would be through "the general con1plete
and rapid abolition of all arn1ed forces."
The Italian delegation proposed the abolition of both
aircraft carriers ·and bo1nbing aircraft.
Other states proposed the prohibition of military
a Yia.tion and of the use of bombs from aircraft.
Even the A1nerican delegation on February 18, 1932,
indicated that the Gover1unent \Yould "join in fornlulating the n1ost effective 1neasures to protect civilian populations against aerial bon1bing."
The Japanese delegation 1nade a sin1ilar proposition
and would also prohibit aircraft-landing platfor1ns and
aircraft carriers.
(d) Use of ga~.-As military aircraft only are entitled to exercise belligerent rights, the rights thus exercised should be li1nited to those of la\vful warfare. The
use of poisonous gases and those that cause unnecessary
suffering is in general prohibited. The use of smoke
screens and of tear gas has not been included in the
category of prohibited acts, but the use of bacteriological
\Varfare has been prohibited.
Hospital ships in lV o•rld lV ar.-There were many
charges and counter-charges in regard to the misuse of
hospital ships during the \"Vorld \Var. The French
Govern1nent even announced that its hospital ships
\vould carry a certain ntunber of Gern1an officers who
had been n1ade prisoners of war, and in retaliation the
German Gover1unent announced that it would expose
French officers in the \var zone on land. In the l\iediterl'anean the controversy was adjusted by an agree1nent
in Septe1nber 1917 that a Spanish officer should acconlpany the hospital ship in order to see th~t the Hague
eonvention should be observed. The experience of the
\"Vorld \"Var sho\ved that in spite of revisions, the
Geneva convention should have still further revision to
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1neet ne'v and changing conditions of warfare. Such
questions arise as: 'Vhat should be the degree of sickness entitling a military n1an to travel upon a hospital
ship; how far may hospital ships evacuate crowded
hospitals on land; might a transport ship on an outward
voyage to the seat of war act as a hospital ship carrying
sick and wounded on its return?
'
In general the tendency during the \V or ld vVar was
to interpret convention X strictly and to confine the
action of the ships to "assisting the wounded, sick, and
ship,vrecked", and not including those 'vounded or sick
on land by evacuating land hospitals.
The "Orel", 1904.-The Orel (Aryol), a stea1ner belonging to the Russian volunteer fleet, "ras chartered at
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese \Var as a hospital
ship to serve the Russian Red Cross. Japan w·as notified, and assented to this action.
En route to the Far East, the Orel on one occasion
conveyed instructions from the co1mnander in chief to
one of the ships of the squadron. She w·as also instructed to purchase insulated wire in Cape Town ..
After arrival in Far Eastern waters, she took on board
the uninjured captain and three 1ne1nbers of the cre'v of
5hip "rhich had been destroyed by a vessel of w·ar of the
Russian fleet. In approaching the Straits of Tsushin1a,
the 01"el 'vas in the position of a fleet reconnaissance
vessel, and 'vas stopped and taken to the Japanese prize
court.
The conclusion of the Court is as follows :
"A hospital ship is only exempt from capture if she fulfils
certain conditions and is engaged solely in the humane work
of aiding the sick and 'vounded. That she is liable to capture,
should she be used by the enemy for military purposes, is
admitted by International Law, and is clearly laid down by the
stipulations of The Hague Convention No. 3 of July 29th, 1899,
for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the
Geneva Convention of August 22nd, 1864. Although the "Orel"
l1ad been lawfully equipped and due notification concerning her
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bad been gi\en by the Russian Goyernment to the Japanese
GoYernment, yet her action in communicating the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Second Pacific Squadron
to other Yessels during her eastward voyage with the squadron,
and her attempt to carry persons in good health, i. e., the
nu1ster and three other members of the crew of a British
steamship captured by the Hussian fleet, to Yladiyostock, which
i:s a na\al port in enemy territon·, were eYiclently acts in aid
cf the military operations of the enemy. Further, "·hen the
f8.cts that she "·as instructed by the Russian squadron to purchase munitions of war, and that she occupied the position
usually assigned to a ship engaged in reconnaissance, are taken
in consideration, it is reasonable to assume that she was constantly employed for n1ilitary puq1oses on behalf of the Russian
squadron. She is, therefore, not entitled to the exemptions laid
down in The Hague Conyention for the adaptation to maritime
warfare of the principles of the GeneYa ConYention, and may
be condemned according to International Law." (2 Hurst and
Bray, Russia and Japanese Prize Cases, p. 354.)

The "Ophelia", 191.1;.-The Ophelia W'as a German
auxiliary 1nilitary hospital ship, 1net in the North Sea
October 18, 1914, and taken on suspicion to a British
port 'vhere she 'vas detained as prize. The Ophelia was
conden1ned as prize on l\Iay 21, 1915, on the ground that
'"she ""aS adapted and used as a signaling ship for Jnilitary purposes." 'The case "·as appealed to the Judicial
Conunittee of the Privy Council w·here a decision was
rendered l\Iay 8, 1916.
Particular reference 'vas 1nade to articles 1 and 8 of
Hague ConYention 10 of 1907.
"ART. 1. J\Iilitary hospital ships, that is to say, ships constructed or adapted by States wholly and solely with a Yiew
to aiding the wounded, sick, and shipwTecked, the na1nes of
which haYe been communicated to the belligerent Powers, shall
be respected and cannot be captured.
"ART. 8. The protection to which hospital ships are entitled
ceases if they are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy.
'!,he presence of wireless telegraphy apparatus on board is not
<I suflicient reason for withdrawing protection."

It "ras stated in this case that the only question in the
nature of a point of la'v 'Yas as to the presence of a.
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wireless telegraphy apparatus. The for1nalities constituting the Ophelia a hospital ship had been 1net.
Question arose as to 'vhether the Ophelia ·was "". holly
and solely" fitted as a hospital ship.
'L'he opinion of Con1n1ancler N e'vn1an " . as stated:
•·In the opinion of Connnander Xewman, who had special
exper1ence in the fitting of hospital ships, the Ophelia was not
only unsuitable for use as a hospital ship, but was undoubtedly
fitted and intended for signalling purposes. He came to that
conclusion without knowing that the ship was suspected of acting
as a signalling ship, and \vhen he had n1erely been instructed to
report on her suitability as a hospital ship." ( [1916] 2 A. C.
206.)

The opinion in the juclg1nent ren1arkecl that"It is obvious that there could hardly be a greater or more
dangerous abuse of the privileges of a hospital ship· than the
communicating to the naval authorities of her nation information which she would be constantly in a position to obtain by
virtue of her immunity. Her signalling avparatus ought to be
confined strictly to what would be necessary for receiving instruction as to her duties and for calling for assistance in the
perfor1nance of them and such like legitimate purposes. That
the risk of such abuse was present to the minds of the framers
of the Hague Coll'vention is shown by the 1nention of wireless
telegraphy. Instead of the signalling apparatus and equipment
of the Ophelia being confined within the narrow limits necessary
for a lJona fide hospital ship, it \vas obviously very largely in excess of them. * * * It is, however, the enormous number of
Yen·'s ~ignal lights which were on board which seemed to the
President, and seems also to the Board, practically conclusive
that the vessel was specially equipped for signalling. These
lights are fired fro1n a special kind of pistol, of which there
were t\VO on board. Of these Yery's liglits she had on boarcl
no less than 600 green, -180 red, and 140 white lights, obviously
a most abnonnal number. It is said by C01nmander Xewman
that a British vessel of the same class would have about 12 of
each. At the trial it was discoYered for the first tin1e that a
record of the number of these lights which had been used, had
been kept, but that it v/as destroyed by the pay1naster by the
order of Captain Pfeiffer after the capture, and on the evening
of the day when they had been informed that the vessel was to
be put in the Prize Court. * * *
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"On these facts the learned President found that the Ophelia
was not adapted or equipped solely as a hospital ship, and with
that finding their Lordships agree. This finding would in itself
justify the condemnation, but the n1atter ought not to be left to
rest tllere, and the use actually made of the Yessel n1ust now
he considered." (Ibid.)

The testilnony as to the use of the Ophelia for hospital 'vork is conflicting, and her moven1ents were regarded as suspicious, and apparently so1ne ship's papers
'vere destroyed. The appeal supported the opinion of
the lower court that"the Ophelia was not constructed, adapted or 'nsed for the
Bpecial and sole purpose of affording aid and relief to the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecl{ed, and that she was adapted and
used as a signalling ship for military purposes." (Ibid.)

0 ont/roversy on use of hospital ships. 1917.-0n J anuary 28, 1917, the Gern1an foreign office requested the
American En1bassy at Berlin to trans1nit to the British
Govern1nent a memorandum respecting the misuse of
hospital ships. In this n1en1orandun1 the first paragraph states :
"For some time the enemy Governments, especially the British
Governn1ent, haYe used their hospital ships not only for the purpose of rendering assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, but also for military purposes, and have thereby violated t.he Hague Convention regarding the application of the
Geneva Convention to maritime w·arfare."
(Parliamentary
Papers, 1\Iiscellaneous, No. 16 [1917] Cd. 8692, p. 3.)

There follow specifications of accusations ·which the
German Government claim have most seriously violated
the Hague convention regarding the application of the
Geneva convention to maritime warfare, and then the
men1orandum concludes:
"In view of the breach of treaty conunitted by their ~nemies
the German Government would be enptled to free themselves
altogether from the obligations contained in the Convention;
for reasons of humanity, however, they desire still to refrain
from doing so. On the other hand, they can no longer permit
the British Government to despatch their troop and munition
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transports to the principal theatre of war under the hypocritical
cloak of the Red Cross. They therefore declare that from this
moment on they will no longer suffer any enemy hospital ship
in the maritime zone which is situated bet\veen the lines Flam~
borough Head to Terschelling on the one hand and Ushant to
Lands End on the other. Should enemy hospital ships be encountered in this maritime zone, after an appropriate lapse of
time, they will be considered as belligerent and will be attacked
without further consideration. The German Government belleve themselves all the more justified in adopting these measures
as the route from Western and Southern France to the 'Vest
of England still remains open for enemy hospital ships, and
the transport of English 'vounded to their homes can consequently be effected now as hei·etofore "·ithout hinderance."
(Ibid., p. 4.)

To the charges made by.the German Government, the
British Government replied that the German vessels o£
'var had neglected the remedy which 'vas legally available to them in ease of suspicion. This was to visit and
inspect the hospital ship in order to determine whether
the suspicion 'vas 'vell founded. After a general denial
of the German charges, each is specifically discussed and
reasons given for the state1nent that British hospital
ships had conforn1ed to the requirements of the Hague
convention.
International Red Cross, 1917.-The German actjon
in regard to hospital ships led the International Red
Cross Comn1ittee to address a protest to the Ger1nan
Government which was later given to the press.
"GeneYe, 14 avril 1917.
"Le 29 janvier 1917, le gouvernen1ent allen1and a rendu une
ordonnance par laquelle, a partir de ce jour, tons les naYireshopitaux portant les marques de la Croix-Rouge seraient considen~s comme vaisseaux de guerre, attaques et coules comme
tels, dans une zone determinee de la l\lanche et de la mer du
Nord.
"Le gouvernement all(jinand donne connne motif de cette
mesure rigoureuse le fait que le gouYernement anglais se servirait habituellement de ses naYires-hopitaux pour le transport
de troupes et de n1unitions, protegees ainsi par le drapeau de la
Croix-Rouge. Le gouvernen1ent allemand puise dans cette
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accusation le droit de se delier vis-a-vi~ d~s na\'h·es-hovitanx
du respect que les cmiYentions de Geneve et de la Haye im11osent
a leur egard.
''Le 20 uuu·s 1D17, un sons-marin allenlaiH1 torpillait !'Asturias, un vaisseau dont I'a11parence ne Iaissait aucun doute
sur sa destination, et qui Ia veille avait depose un grand
nombre fle blesses et <le· mnlndes. PreC'edPmment cleja, un autre
gt·and vaisseau-hopital, Ie Britannic, avait eu Ie 1neme sort.
''Le Cmnite international, qui a le droit et le devoir de faire
respecter les principes de la Croix-Rouge et de la convention de
Geneve, en signalant les atteintes que pourraient y etre portees,
attire la tres serieuse attention du gouvernement imperial sur
la responsabilite qu'il asstunerait vis-a-vis du 1nonde civilise en
persistant dans une resolution en contradiction avec les conYentions humanitaires qu-il s'est SOlennellement engage a respecter.
"En torpillant des navires-hopitaux, on s'attaque non a des
combattants, mais h des etres sans defense a des blesses mutiles
ou brises par Ia lllitraille, a des fenunes que se L1evouent a une
oeuvre de secours et de charite, a des hommes qui ont pour annes
non celles qui sen·ent a oter la vie a l'adversaire, mais celles
au contraire qui peu\ent la lui conserver et apporter quelque
soulagement a ses souffrances.
"Tout naYire-hOpital muni des signes exterieurs prevus par les
conventions internationales et dont 1nise t'n sen·ice a ete
regulierement notifiee aux belligerants, est au benefice d'une
presomption !{~gale et doit etre respecte par les belligerants.
"Ceux-ci, s'ils ont de justes motifs de craindre qu'un navirehOpital soit partielle1nent affecte a des buts n1ilitaires, ont sur
lui, en vertu de !'article 4 de la convention de la Haye, le droit
de contrOie et de visite: ils peuYent lui imposer une direction
detenninee et mettre a bord un Cmnmissaire, 1neme le detenir,
si la gravite des circonstances l'exige. Ils n'ont en aucun cas
le droit de le couler et d'exposer a la mort tout Ie personnel
hospitalier et les blesses transportes par ce uavire.
"I./Asturias parait avoir ete torpilM sans qu'on se soit preoccupe ni de son caractere, ni de sa destination.
":\Ieme si l'on ad1nettait !'exactitude des faits sur lesquels
I' Allemagne s'appuie pour justifier son ordonnance, le Comite
international estime que rien ne saurait excuser le 1orpillag~
d'un navire-hOpital.
"C'est pourquoi, considerant !'ordonnance du 29 janvier comme
f:tant en desaccon1 avec les conventions internationa1es, il ex-
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prhne le voeu que cette ordonnance ne soit plus appliquee
l'avenir.

a

"Au. n01n dn COJnite international de la Croix-Rouge:

"Le President,
"G. ADOR.
"Les vicc-Pn3sidents,
"Prof. Ad. d'EsPINE,
"EDOUARD NAVILLE."

(Revue de Droit International Public, vol. 24 (1917), no. 6,
p. 471.)

(e) Hospital ships.-Hospital ships are not to be used
"for any military purpose." . A.s long as the hospital
ships confor1n to the provisions of the Geneva convention they are not to be captured and are granted in
neutral ports exe1nption fron1 the usual restrictions a pplying to vessels of war. These exe1nptions are granted
on the ground of the humanitarian occupation to which
the hospital ship is devoted and the exen1ption ceases
\vhen other use is 1nade of the vess'el. At such time each
state n1ust, considering the circtunstances, deter1nine its
attitude tow·ard and treahnent of the ship. The neutral
state must fulfil its obligations and the belligerent state
n1ay exercise its rights.
As the hospital ship is supposed to be an unarmed
vessel with a nonbelligerent personnel and incapacitated
or ship,vrecked persons on board and as by the Geneva
convention belligerents have the right to "control and
visit" hospital ships or even to detain them, there would
seen1 to be no ground for firing upon such a ship unless
to bring it to if it \\"as atte1npting to escape.
SOLUTION

(a) 1. The private neutral seaplane alighting "rithin
the blockade lines should be seized. The proof of innocence rests upon the seaplane.
2. The private neutral seaplane alighting 50 1niles
outside the blockade lines is not liable to seizure unless
on grounds discovered by visit and search.
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(b) The military aircraft and cre'v should be interned by state B.
(c) The ar1ned private aircraft of state X should not
be supplied ""ith fu~l in a port of R.
(d) The use of tear gas by one belligerent against
another is not prohibited, therefore the resort to the
use of bacteriological bombs in retaliation is unla,vful.
(e). 1. Neutral state C, while not under obligation
to pass upon the character of an act of a hospital ship
of a belligerent, 1nay treat such a ship as a vessel of
w·ar if convinced that the ship has forfeited its imnlunities.
2. The capture of the Safety by the fleet of Y is lawful, but care should be taken to restrict the use of force
to the minilnun1.

